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Abstract—Distributed estimation that recruits potentially large
groups of humans to collect data about a phenomenon of interest
has emerged as a paradigm applicable to a broad range of
detection and estimation tasks. However, it also presents a
number of challenges especially with regard to user participation
and data quality, since the data resources may be strategic
human agents instead of physical sensors. We consider a static
estimation problem in which an estimator collects data from self-
interested agents. Since it incurs cost to participate, mechanisms
to incentivize the agents to collect and transmit data of desired
quality are needed. Agents are strategic in the sense that they
can take measurement with different levels of accuracy by
expending different levels of effort. They may also misreport their
information in order to obtain greater compensation, if possible.
With both the measurements from the agents and their accuracy
unknown to the estimator, we design incentive mechanisms that
encourage desired behavior from strategic agents. Specifically, we
solve an optimization problem at the estimator which minimizes
the expected total compensation to the agents while guaranteeing
a specified quality of the global estimate.
Index Terms—Mechanism design, game theory, distributed
estimation, crowdsourcing, knapsack problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed estimation theory to solve the problem of fusing
data from a group of sensors to estimate a parameter or
a random variable is a well-developed field. More recently,
the emerging areas of social computing and crowdsourcing
have enabled many large scale sensing and estimation tasks
that leverage many humans (or human owned and operated
devices) to collect data about phenomena of interest (see works
such as [1], [2] for an overview). An example is that of
aggregating information and opinions of a ‘crowd’ recruited
using Amazon Mechanical Turk to perform tasks that are
time consuming and difficult to scale such as image labeling.
Similar applications have been proposed or demonstrated in
the fields ranging from environmental monitoring [3], health
data collection [4], traffic monitoring [5], and so on.
Beyond already existing challenges in traditional distributed
estimation or detection [6]–[8], new challenges arise in the
design of such a crowdsensing system since data sources may
not have any incentive to provide the data aggregator with the
quality of data that it desires [9]. This might be due to the fact
that sensors may have to exert resources (e.g., time, power, or
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bandwidth) to produce an accurate measurement [10]. Further,
even though the sensors may have accurate data, they may
still wish to corrupt data before transmission either to gain
privacy or for some other selfish reason [11]. Early work in
this field (e.g., [12]–[14]) ignored these issues and assumed
that participants were voluntary recruits who would collect
and provide high quality data. More recently, it has been
recognized that without a suitable incentive being present, such
voluntary providers of data may not be enough to generate an
estimate of desired quality. As an illustrative example, [15]
studied product reviews on Amazon.com and concluded that
users with a moderate outlook are unlikely to report; thus,
while controlled experiments on the same items reveal nor-
mally distributed opinions, voluntarily reported ratings often
follow bi-modal, U-shaped distributions where most of the
ratings are either very good or very bad.
Accordingly, there has been recent work on designing
mechanisms that incentivize data sources (i) to participate
and generate measurements of sufficient quality (i.e. effort
exertion), and (ii) to report these measurements and their
quality accurately (i.e. truthful elicitation). Incentivization may
be through monetary or non-monetary rewards for the sensors.
A review of various incentive mechanisms, including both
monetary and non-monetary incentives, is provided in [10],
[16], [17]. As an illustration, if the agents cannot falsify
data and the problem is solely to incentivize effort exertion,
mechanisms such as those in [18]–[24] have been proposed.
Similarly, for the problem of truthful elicitation, the class
of mechanisms called peer prediction mechanisms has been
developed with different information structures (see e.g., [25]–
[29]) to incentivize the agents to report truthfully in a game-
theoretic equilibrium.
However, most of the works in the literature focused on
either truthfulness elicitation or effort elicitation, without con-
sidering how much total reward is to be paid, or the trade-off
between the total payment and the estimate accuracy at the
estimator. A systematic theory that addresses the challenges of
incentive mechanism design with the objective of optimizing
the overall cost function at the estimator is not well studied.
In this paper, we address the mechanism design problem at
the estimator of minimizing expected total compensation to
be made to the strategic agents while guaranteeing a specified
quality of global estimate, with both the measurements and
their accuracy from the strategic agents unknown to the
estimator.
The works that are closest seem to be [30]–[33]. [30] con-
sidered a model that determines the compensation to strategic
agents by verifying their reports with the ground truth of the
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phenomenon of interest, which was assumed available to the
estimator after the estimation process. However, this is not
applicable in many cases where the reports to be collected
are subjective, such as collecting ratings for a product from
consumers. In this paper, we do not require the availability of
ground truth. [31] considered the mechanism design problem
from the perspective of an estimator who cares about both the
estimate accuracy and the total payment with the assumption
that the actual effort costs of the agents are drawn from a
known distribution. Although this assumption can be relaxed
by learning the distribution in a sequential setting [32], their
model is limited to a binary-answer task (e.g., an image
contains a certain object or not) and a binary effort model
(e.g., either exert a fixed level of effort at a fixed cost or no
effort and no cost at all). Different from solving the discrete
value tasks (i.e., detection problem or classification problem)
such as image labeling and spectrum occupancy sensing, we
focus on estimation tasks with continuous measurements and
continuous effort models. Finally, unlike [33] where the model
is limited to a specific effort cost function, we do not restrict
the format of effort cost function.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
the problem statement is presented. In Section III, we solve
the optimization problem at the estimator to minimize total
compensation while guaranteeing a certain estimation accu-
racy. Next, in Section IV, we present an optimal mechanism
that achieves the desired behavior from the strategic agents in
a Nash equilibrium when the cost functions of the strategic
agents satisfy a certain property. In Section V, we provide a
feasibility-guaranteed sub-optimal mechanism when the cost
functions of the strategic agents do not satisfy that property.
Section VI provides some simulation experiments and Section
VII concludes the paper.
Notation: EX [f ] denotes the expectation of function f
taken with respect to the random variable X; when X is
explained from the context, the notation is abbreviated as E[f ].
A Gaussian distribution is denoted by N (m,σ2) where m is
the mean and σ is the standard deviation. A tuple of n elements
is denoted with parentheses by (e1, e2, · · · , en).
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Estimation Setup: Consider a scalar-valued random vari-
able X that is distributed according to a prior distribution
X ∼ N (0, σ2x) and takes an unknown value x in an ex-
periment. An estimator (also called an aggregator) seeks to
estimate the value x using observations from N sensors (also
called agents). The i-th sensor generates an observation yi ∈ R
according to the relation
yi = x+ vi, (1)
where vi is the measurement noise that is distributed according
to a Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2i .
We assume that the measurement noises for the N sensors
are mutually independent and further independent with the
variable X . For notational ease, we denote by ξ the reciprocal
of the variance, i.e., ξx = σ−2x and ξi = σ
−2
i .
For each sensor i, given the measurement yi, the minimum
mean square error (MMSE) estimate xˆi and the corresponding
local mean squared error (MSE) Σi can be computed as
xˆi =
σ2x
σ2x + σ
2
i
yi, (2)
Σi =
1
σ−2x + σ−2i
=
1
ξx + ξi
. (3)
We denote xˆi as the local estimate and Σi as the local MSE at
the i-th sensor since these quantities are obtained based on the
information at each sensor. These local estimates can be fused
to obtain the global MMSE estimate xˆg using the relation [34]
Σ−1g xˆg =
N∑
i=1
Σ−1i xˆi, (4)
where Σg is the global MSE corresponding to xˆg and can be
calculated as
Σ−1g =
N∑
i=1
Σ−1i − (N − 1)σ−2x = ξx +
N∑
i=1
ξi. (5)
Effort Cost: The variance σ2i affects the quality of the
measurement at sensor i and is assumed to be a parameter that
is under the control of the sensor. In other words, the sensor
can put in more effort and decrease the variance σ2i while
incurring a higher effort cost. The effort cost may represent
usage of battery, time, or some other resource. For simplicity
and without loss of generality, we assume that ξi is the effort
level of agent i that incurs an effort cost ci(ξi). We make some
weak assumptions on the cost function that describes the effort
cost.
Assumption 1: The cost function of each sensor ci(ξi)
satisfies the following properties:
• ci(ξi) ≥ 0, i.e., effort cost is non-negative;
•
∂ci(ξi)
∂ξi
> 0, i.e., more effort cost is incurred to obtain a
measurement with higher accuracy;
• ξi ∈ [0, ξiu] and ci(ξi) ∈ [0, ciu].
Note that when sensor i does not put in any effort, i.e., ξi = 0
and σ2i = ∞, then the effort cost is zero, i.e., ci(0) = 0 and
its local MSE is equal to the variance of the prior distribution
of X , i.e., Σi = σ2x.
Formulation as a Mechanism Design Problem: We are in-
terested in a formulation in which the estimator and the sensors
are all self-interested. The estimator is interested in generating
a global estimate with a specified accuracy as measured by the
global MSE. To do so, it must incentivize sensors to generate
and transmit measurements with sufficiently low local MSE.
On the other hand, the sensors do not gain directly from the
estimator being able to generate an accurate global estimate.
Since they incur effort costs to generate measurements with
low local MSE, the estimator must compensate the sensors
using a payment mechanism of some sort, for simplicity,
we assume the payment is monetary, although money may
be thought of as a proxy of some other resource such as
battery charging. The problem we consider in this paper is
to minimize the payment from the estimator to incentivize
Estimator
𝐴" 𝐴#𝑡%
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Fig. 1. Timeline and communication topology of the incentive mechanism
design problem.
self-interested sensors to obtain and report measurements with
sufficient accuracy that allow the global MSE to be below a
specified level.
We now formulate this interaction as a mechanism design
problem. The timeline of the interaction is as shown in Fig 1.
The estimator asks each sensor to report its measurement and
local estimate. Note that reporting this pair is equivalent to
reporting the local estimate and the local MSE. The strategy
sets and the utility functions of each player are given as below.
• Strategy sets: Each sensor can choose the level of effort to
exert and the values of its measurement and local estimate
that it reports. For each sensor i, we define its strategy
as choosing each element in the following tuple
si = (ξi, xˆri, yri),
where xˆri is the reported local estimate and yri is the
reported measurement. Denote the set of all feasible
si’s by Si. With a slight abuse of standard notation in
game theory, when sensor i adopts strategy si, denote
by s−i = (s1, s2, · · · , si−1, si+1, · · · , sN ) the strategy
profile of all the other sensors except for sensor i. The
estimator decides how much payment each sensor i will
obtain and how to fuse the reports from the sensors. Since
the sensors may misreport their local estimates, (4) may
not be the optimal way to fuse local reported estimates
from the sensors. Thus, the strategy of the estimator
includes the payment functions that map each strategy
profile of the sensors to their payments and the fusion
rule, i.e.,
se = (pi(s1, · · · , sN ), `(s1, · · · , sN )),
where pi(s1, · · · , sN ) denotes the payment made to sen-
sor i which is in general a function of the strategies
of all the sensors, and `(s1, · · · , sN ) is the fusion rule
used to obtain the global estimate. Note that the payment
pi(s1, s2, · · · , sN ) can also be expressed as pi(si, s−i).
Denote the set of all feasible strategies se’s by Se.
• Utility Functions: The expected utility of each sensor i
is given by
E[Ui] = E[pi(si, s−i)− ci(ξi)], (6)
where the expectation is taken over the uncertainties of
the random variable X and measurement noises. Thus
each sensor i optimizes over the effort level and reports
to maximize its expected utility,
max
si∈Si
E[Ui]. (7)
On the other hand, the estimator is interested in min-
imizing the expected total payment while obtaining a
global estimate with MSE less than a certain threshold.
Formally, the optimization problem at the estimator is
given as follows
min
se∈Se
E
[
N∑
i=1
pi(si, s−i)
]
s.t. Σg ≤ Σt,
E[pi(si, s−i)− ci(ξi)] ≥ 0,∀i,
si = arg maxE[pi(si, s−i)− ci(ξi)],∀i,
(8)
where Σt is the specified threshold on the global MSE.
The second constraint above ensures individual rational-
ity, which is necessary for the sensors to participate.
In the sequel, we solve problem (8). Note that problem (8)
specifies a game among the sensors since their utilities depend
on actions taken by all of them. We will consider the solution
of the optimization problem when the behavior of the sensors
is specified according to a Nash equilibrium.
III. OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM AT THE ESTIMATOR
To understand why the problem (8) is difficult to solve, we
note why some intuitive incentive mechanisms may not work.
• A payment scheme pi = c for a constant c that does
not depend on the reports will lead to each sensor not
making any effort and reporting some arbitrary value to
the estimator. In economics, this is termed as the problem
of moral hazard.
• A payment scheme that specifies pi as a decreasing
function of Σi or ξi can be considered to incentivize the
sensors to exert effort and take accurate measurements.
However, it will lead sensors reporting very low local
MSE irrespective of the actual effort made. This is termed
as the problem of adverse selection.
In either case, note that the actual measurements yi, local
estimates xˆi and the local MSE Σi are all unknown to the
estimator, fusing reported local estimates to obtain a global
estimate that satisfies the constraint Σg ≤ Σt is also a
nontrivial problem. The overall optimization problem (8) is
even more difficult.
Our results are organized as shown in Fig. 2. Specifically,
we show that the following technical condition on the effort
cost functions plays an important role in the simplification of
the problem:
− 2∂ci(ξi)
∂ξi
− ∂
2ci(ξi)
∂ξ2i
(ξx + ξi) < 0, ∀ξi and i. (9)
Remark 1: If ci(ξi) is convex over ξi, the constraint (9)
holds for any ξi.
Depending on whether (9) is satisfied or not, we have the
following result.
Cost	
functions
satisfy	(9)?	
Given	𝑁, Σ$, 𝜎&', 𝑐) . , 𝜉𝑖𝑢
Solve	(10)
Yes
No
Solve	(11) Use	ℳ' to	justifyProposition	2
Use	ℳ/ to	justify
Proposition	1
Fig. 2. The procedure of designing the incentive mechanism with strategic
data sources.
Proposition 1: Consider the setup of problem (8). If condi-
tion (9) is satisfied, the estimator can specify a payment design
such that
1) the selected sensors exert the effort levels specified by
the estimator;
2) the selected sensors report truthfully about their mea-
surements and local estimates;
3) the expected payment to each selected sensor is the effort
cost of the sensor for the specified effort level.
Note that under these three conditions, the estimator can
choose the optimal effort levels from agents that yield min-
imum payment while meeting the constraints in problem (8)
with the fusion rule as shown in (4). Thus, in this case, the
optimization problem (8) reduces to
min
φ,ξ
N∑
i=1
φici(ξi)
s.t.
1
ξx +
∑N
i=1 φiξi
≤ Σt,
φi ∈ (0, 1),
ξi ∈ [0, ξiu],
(10)
where ξ = (ξ1, ξ2, · · · , ξN ) and φ = (φ1, φ2, · · · , φN ). φi is
an indicator about whether or not the estimator selects agent i:
φi = 1 represents the case where the estimator selects agent
i and φi = 0 represents the case where the estimator does
not select agent i, which can be implemented by, for instance,
setting pi = 0.
In Section IV, we show that if the cost functions satisfy
constraint (9), a mechanismM1 can be designed that specifies
a payment design according to Proposition 1. Thus, problem
(8) can be solved optimally. Otherwise if the cost functions
does not satisfy constraint (9), we solve the problem in a sub-
optimal way through the following proposition. This will be
proved through the design of a mechanism M2 presented in
Section V.
Proposition 2: Consider the setup of problem (8). If the
condition (9) is not satisfied, the estimator can specify a
payment design such that
1) the selected sensors would exert their maximum effort
levels;
2) the selected sensors report truthfully about their mea-
surements and local estimates;
3) the expected payment to each selected sensor i is the
effort cost of the sensor for its maximum effort level.
Note that under these three conditions, the estimator cannot
choose the optimal effort levels from sensors as in Proposition
1. But the estimator can still select a subset of all agents
given that the selected agents will exert their maximum efforts
and the estimator will pay the corresponding costs incurred at
maximum effort levels. Formally, problem (8) is transformed
to the following well-defined binary knapsack problem (KP):
min
φ
N∑
i=1
φici(ξiu)
s.t.
1
ξx +
∑N
i=1 φiξiu
≤ Σt,
φi ∈ (0, 1).
(11)
This problem is NP-hard but can be solved exactly in pseudo-
polynomial time through dynamic programming algorithms
[35].
IV. OPTIMAL MECHANISM WHEN (9) HOLDS
In this section, we address the cases where (9) holds.
We first simplify the optimization problem (10) and present
two interesting special cases. Then we present an optimal
mechanism to prove Proposition 1.
A. Solving Problem (10)
(10) can be rewritten as
min
φ,ξ
N∑
i=1
φici(ξi)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
φiξi ≥ Σ−1t − ξx,
φi ∈ (0, 1),
ξi ∈ [0, ξiu].
(12)
This is a mixed-integer nonlinear programming problem and
specifically known as the general knapsack problem (GKP)
with variable coefficients [36] [37], which is difficult to solve
in general. However, since ci(0) = 0, ∀i, we can transform
problem (12) to problem (13) according to the following result.
Lemma 1: Problem (12) can be solved by constructing
solution of the following optimization problem
min
ξ
N∑
i=1
ci(ξi)
s.t.
N∑
i=1
ξi ≥ Σ−1t − ξx,
ξi ∈ [0, ξiu].
(13)
Proof: Suppose that the minimum of (12), denoted by O1,
is achieved at (ξO1, φO1) and the minimum of (13), denoted
by O2, is achieved at ξO2. We have O1 ≤ O2 because (13) is
a special case of (12) by fixing all φi = 1. On the other hand,
O1 ≥ O2, because any value achieved in (12) can be achieved
in (13) by constructing ξO2 from (ξO1, φO1) as
ξO2i =
{
ξO1i , for φ
O1
i = 1,
0, for φO1i = 0.
(14)
Thus, O1 = O2. In general, it is easier to solve (13) first and
then construct (ξO1, φO1) from ξO2 by setting
(ξO1i , φ
O1
i ) =
{
(ξO2i , 1), for ξ
O2
i 6= 0,
(r, 0), for ξO2i = 0,
(15)
where r can be any number since φO1i = 0.
We now present two interesting special cases.
1) Special Case: Continuous Quadratic Cost Function:
A quadratic effort cost ci(ξi) = lξ2i is quite popular, e.g., in
control theory. In this case, then the optimization problem (13)
becomes,
min
ξ
N∑
i=1
lξ2i
s.t.
N∑
i=1
ξi ≥ Σ−1t − ξx,
ξi ∈ [0, ξiu],
(16)
which is a standard Quadratic Programming (QP) problem.
According to Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, the optimal solution
of (16) is given by
ξ˜1 = ξ˜2 = ... = ξ˜N =
Σ−1t − ξx
N
, (17)
assuming for simplicity that Σ
−1
t −ξx
N ≤ ξiu.
As stated in Remark 1, since the cost function is con-
vex, the constraint (9) holds for any possible ξi. Under our
optimal mechanism (presented in Section IV-B), there is a
Nash equilibrium where all agents select the effort level as
Σ−1t −ξx
N and report truthfully about their local estimates and
their measurements. Meanwhile, the minimum expected total
payment that can be achieved to ensure global MSE to be no
greater than Σt is
l(Σ−1t − ξx)2
N
.
2) Special Case: Discrete Linear Cost Function: A natural
model is that each agent can increase the accuracy of its local
estimate by taking more measurements and estimating based
upon the sample mean. For instance, if agent i takes ηi number
of measurements of the following
yi(1) = x+ vi(1),
yi(2) = x+ vi(2),
...
yi(ηi) = x+ vi(ηi),
(18)
where vi(k) follows i.i.d. Gaussian distribution N (0, σ2io).
Denote the effort cost of taking each measurement by a cost
of cio. Then the noise level, effort level and effort cost of
the sample mean y¯i = x + v¯i averaged from taking ηi
measurements are respectively given by
σ2i =
σ2io
ηi
,
ξi = ηiσ
−2
io ,
ci(ξi) = ηicio = σ
2
iocioξi.
(19)
Therefore in this case, the effort cost function a linear function
and the effort level depends on the number of measurements
taken. We denote the corresponding maximum number of mea-
surements by ηmi . The optimization problem (13) becomes,
min
η
N∑
i=1
ηicio
s.t.
N∑
i=1
ηiσ
−2
io ≥ Σ−1t − ξx,
ηi ∈ (0, 1, ..., ηmi ),
(20)
which is known as the Bounded Knapsack Problem (BKP). It
is NP-hard but it can be solved exactly in pseudo-polynomial
time through dynamic programming algorithms [35] [38].
Denote by η˜ = (η˜1, η˜2, ..., η˜N ) the optimal solution of (20).
Under our optimal mechanism, there is a Nash equilibrium
where each agent takes η˜i number of measurements and
report truthfully about the local estimate and measurement.
Meanwhile, the minimum expected total payment that can be
achieved to ensure global MSE to be no greater than Σt is∑N
i=1 η˜icio.
B. Optimal Mechanism
Denoting the optimal solution of problem (13) by ξ˜ =
(ξ˜1, ξ˜2, ..., ξ˜N ), we now present mechanism M1 that fulfills
Proposition 1, i.e., under Mechanism M1, all the agents
exerting the desired effort levels and reporting their measure-
ments and local estimates truthfully is a Nash equilibrium. In
addition, the expected payment to each agent i is the effort
cost of the agent for the specified effort level.
In our proposed incentive mechanismM1, agents are asked
to report two items (xˆri, yri), where xˆri is the reported local
estimate and yri is the reported measurement. Note that xˆri 6=
xˆi and yri 6= yi in general since agents may falsify their
reports to maximize their utilities. The payment function is
given by
pi(xˆri, yrj) = γi − βi(xˆri − yrj)2, (21)
where yrj is the reported measurement from another agent
j 6= i. As before, agents are interested in maximizing their
expected utilities,
s∗i = arg max
si∈Si
E [Ui] = arg max
si∈Si
E [pi(xˆri, yrj)− ci(ξi)] .
(22)
Now, we state our results about the optimal mechanismM1.
Theorem 1: Consider the problem (8) when (9) holds. Let
(21) be the payment function to each sensor i with
βi =
∂ci(ξi)
∂ξi
∣∣∣∣
ξi=
˜
ξi
(ξx + ξ˜i)
2, (23)
and
γi = βi
(
1
ξx + ξ˜i
+ ξ˜−1j
)
+ ci(ξ˜i). (24)
The strategy profile s∗ = (s∗1, s
∗
2, ..., s
∗
N ) with
s∗i = (ξi = ξ˜i, xˆri = xˆi, yri = yi) (25)
is a Nash equilibrium of the mechanism design problem (8).
In addition, the expected payment to each agent is the effort
cost, i.e., E[pi] = ci(ξ˜i).
Proof: See Appendix A.
Intuitively, the payment is designed as a function of the dif-
ference between the reports from the agents, which motivates
each agent to estimate the information of another agent based
on her own information. The accuracy of the agent’s estimate,
and the corresponding expected payment, will depend on
how much effort is exerted when the agent obtains her own
information. Therefore, βi can be designed as in (23) so that
the effort level that the estimator wishes each agent to exert
(i.e., ξ˜i) will turn out to be exactly the optimal choice for agent
i when all the other agents exert the effort levels desired by
the estimator, i.e., ξj = ξ˜j ,∀j 6= i. Further, γi can be designed
as in (24) so that the expected payment is small but enough
to cover the effort cost.
It is worth remarking that the estimation of the reports
among the agents is in a game setting, which means the desired
strategy profile s∗ from all the agents is obtained in a Nash
equilibrium sense. Further, if there exists an ‘honest’ agent
who reports its measurement and effort level truthfully, it is
no longer needed to ask the strategic agents to report their
measurements. In this case, the desired strategy profile s∗ is
an equilibrium in strictly dominant strategies in which every
s∗i is the strictly dominant strategy for agent i. We present the
result in the following corollary.
Corollary 1: Consider the setting of Theorem 1 with an
honest agent h who reports its measurement and effort level
truthfully, i.e., yrh = yh = x + vh, where vh ∼ N (0, ξ−1h ).
Let the payment function to each sensor i be specified by
(21), (23) and (24) after replacing yrj and ξ˜j with yrh and ξh
respectively. The strategy profile s∗
′
= (s∗
′
1 , s
∗′
2 , ..., s
∗′
N ) with
s∗
′
i = (ξi = ξ˜i, xˆri = xˆi) (26)
is the unique equilibrium in strictly dominant strategies.
Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1.
The only difference in this case is that the strategic agents now
estimate the measurement from the honest agent instead of
estimating the measurement from another strategic agent. The
utility of each strategic agent will no longer depend on other
strategic agents, thus, the strategy in the Nash equilibrium is
the strictly dominant strategy for each agent and the Nash
equilibrium is the unique equilibrium.
V. A SUB-OPTIMAL MECHANISM WHEN (9) DOES NOT
HOLD
In this section, we provide a feasibility-guaranteed sub-
optimal mechanism M2 for the cases where the constraint
(9) can not be satisfied. M2 achieves truthful reporting and
elicits maximum effort from the selected agents with expected
payment to selected agent i being the effort cost ci(ξiu) in a
Nash equilibrium sense.
Denote the optimal solution to (11) as φ˜ = (φ˜1, φ˜2, ..., φ˜N ).
We present the incentive mechanismM2 that only selects the
agents for which φ˜i = 1 and elicits their maximum efforts.
Theorem 2: Consider the problem (8) when (9) does not
hold. Let the payment to each sensor i with φ˜i = 1 be
determined by comparing its reported local estimate with the
reported measurement from another agent j with φ˜j = 1, i.e.,
pi(xˆri, yrj) =
{
γi − βi(xˆri − yrj)2, for φ˜i = 1
0, for φ˜i = 0
(27)
with
βi > max
ξi∈[0,ξiu]
∂ci(ξi)
∂ξi
(ξx + ξi)
2 (28)
and
γi = βi(
1
ξx + ξiu
+ ξ−1ju )− ci(ξiu). (29)
The strategy profile s∗ = (s∗1, s
∗
2, ..., s
∗
N ) with
s∗i =
{
(ξi = ξiu, xˆri = xˆi, yri = yi), for φ˜i = 1
(ξi = 0, xˆri = xˆi, yri = yi), for φ˜i = 0
(30)
is a Nash equilibrium of the mechanism design problem (8).
In addition, the expected payment to each agent is the effort
cost for its maximum effort level, i.e., E[pi] = ci(ξiu).
Proof: See Appendix B.
Similarly, if there exists an honest agent who reports its
measurement and effort level truthfully, it is no longer needed
to ask the strategic agents to report their measurements. In
this case, the desired strategy profile is the unique equilibrium
with strictly dominant strategies.
Corollary 2: Consider the setting in Theorem 2 with an
honest agent h who reports its measurement and effort level
truthfully, i.e., yrh = yh = x + vh, where vh ∼ N (0, ξ−1h ).
Let the payment function be specified by (27), (28) and (29)
after replacing yrj and ξ˜j with yrh and ξh respectively. The
strategy profile s∗
′
= (s∗
′
1 , s
∗′
2 , ..., s
∗′
N ) with
s∗
′
i =
{
(ξi = ξiu, xˆri = xˆi), for φ˜i = 1
(ξi = 0, xˆri = xˆi), for φ˜i = 0
(31)
is the unique equilibrium in strictly dominant strategies.
The proof is omitted since it is similar to that of Corollary
1.
VI. SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we demonstrate our mechanisms with simu-
lation experiments. We first consider the setting of the problem
in Section IV-A2 and investigate the minimum payment at
different threshold Σt. N = 100 agents are simulated and the
variance of the prior distribution is selected as σ2x = 1000.
Further, fixing the minimum variance of each agent σ2il and
its corresponding maximum effort ciu allows us to study the
effect ηmi , which can be interpreted as the quantization level
of the effort cost of each agent. Without loss of generosity,
we set ηmi = η
m for all i. To make the agents hetero-
geneous on their highest accuracies, we randomly generate
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Fig. 3. Scatter plot and histograms of σ2il and ciu.
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Fig. 4. Minimum payments with N = 100, and ηm = 2, ηm = 4, ηm =
100 respectively.
σ−2il ∼ U [0.0001, 0.01], which is selected such that roughly a
half of σ2il fall in the range [100, 200] and the other half of
σ2il fall in the range [200, 10000]. ciu is randomly generated
from a mixture Gaussian distribution ciu ∼ .5N (50, 100) +
.5N (100, 100). The scatter plot and histograms of these two
parameters are shown in Fig. 3.
The minimum payments with ηm = 2, ηm = 4, and
ηm = 100 at different threshold Σt are shown in Fig. 4. In
general, greater ηm yields smaller payment. On the other hand,
we also study the effect of N . We use the same distributions
to generate σ2il and ciu. η
m is fixed as ηm = 2. As shown in
Fig. 5, more agents being available generally yields smaller
payments. Lastly, we compare our sub-optimal case with the
optimal case considered in Section IV-A2 under the same
setting. Recall that in the sub-optimal solution, our mechanism
M2 yields all selected agents exerting maximum effort. Using
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Fig. 5. Minimum payments with ηm = 2, and N = 100, N = 500,
N = 1000 respectively.
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Fig. 6. Comparison of minimum payments in the sub-optimal case and the
optimal case.
the same simulated parameters, the optimization problem (11)
in the sub-optimal case can be viewed a problem similar to
(20), but the decision variables are limited to be either 0 or
ηm. In Fig. 6, we show the comparison of minimum payments
between the sub-optimal case and the optimal case at different
Σt with ηm = 2 and N = 100.
VII. SUMMARY
In this paper, we designed incentive mechanisms for a static
estimation problem where the data sources are strategic agents
whose measurements and accuracies are both unknown to
the estimator. The objective of the incentive mechanism is
to minimize the expected total payment made to the agents
with a guaranteed quality of global estimate. We formulate
the problem in a very general setting without assuming any
specific format of the agents’ cost functions. Instead, we
designed an optimal incentive mechanism for the cases where
the cost functions satisfy certain property and provided a
sub-optimal incentive mechanism for the other cases. We
also demonstrated our mechanisms by two special cases with
continuous quadratic cost function and discrete linear cost
function. Both in the special case with the discrete linear cost
function and in the sub-optimal case, the optimization problem
were transformed to knapsack problems, which can be solved
in pseudo-polynomial time by dynamic programming. Future
work will include extending the results to dynamic estimation
problems.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
It suffices to prove that if the strategy profile of all the other
agents follow the stated equilibrium, denoted as s−i = s∗−i,
agent i does not have another strategy which yields greater
expected utility than s∗i . Mathematically, when s−i = s
∗
−i, the
optimal strategy for agent i is given by
(ξ∗i , xˆ
∗
ri, y
∗
ri) = arg maxE[Ui]
= arg maxE
[
γi − βi(xˆri − yj)2 − ci(ξi)
∣∣ xˆi].
(32)
First notice that the estimator can not verify the reports xˆ∗ri
and y∗ri jointly, since
xˆi =
ξ−1x
ξ−1x + ξ−1i
yi, (33)
and ξi is unknown to the estimator. Therefore, the agent can
optimize xˆ∗ri and y
∗
ri independently. However, the expected
utility is indifferent to yri, hence no other value can yield
greater utility than y∗ri = yi.
Next, we prove that for any given ξi, the optimal xˆ∗ri = xˆi.
Since βi and γi are positive constants and ξi is fixed,
xˆ∗ri = arg minE
[
(xˆri − yj)2
∣∣ xˆi]
= E[yj | xˆi]
= Cyj xˆiC
−1
xˆixˆi
xˆi,
(34)
where Cyj xˆi and Cxˆixˆi are computed as
Cyj xˆi = E
[
(x+ vj)
ξ−1x
ξ−1x + ξ−1i
(x+ vi)
]
=
ξ−2x
ξ−1x + ξ−1i
,
(35)
and
Cxˆixˆi = E
[(
ξ−1x
ξ−1x + ξ−1i
(x+ vi)
)2]
=
ξ−2x
ξ−1x + ξ−1i
, (36)
since the noises and x are all independent to each other.
Now, we show that with βi given by (23) and if the
constraint (9) is satisfied at ξ˜i, then the optimal ξ∗i = ξ˜i. For
any given ξi, the expected utility with the optimal choice of
xˆri is given by
E[Ui(ξi)] = γi − βi E[(xˆi − yj)2]− ci(ξi), (37)
where
E[(xˆi − yj)2] = E
[(
ξ−1x
ξ−1x + ξ−1i
(x+ vi)− (x+ vj)
)2]
=
ξ−1i ξ
−1
x
ξ−1i + ξ
−1
x
+ ξ−1j
=
1
ξi + ξx
+ ξ˜−1j .
(38)
Thus, setting the first derivative of E[Ui(ξi)] over ξi to zero
yields the unique maximum ξ∗i if E[Ui(ξi)] is concave:
∂ E[Ui(ξi)]
∂ξi
=
βi
(ξi + ξx)2
− ∂ci(ξi)
∂ξi
= 0, (39)
where the solution is ξ˜i if βi is given by
βi =
∂ci(ξi)
∂ξi
∣∣∣∣
ξi=
˜
ξi
(ξ˜i + ξx)
2. (40)
To guarantee the concavity of E[Ui(ξi)],
∂2 E[Ui(ξi)]
∂ξ2i
=
−2βi
(ξi + ξx)3
− ∂
2ci(ξi)
∂ξ2i
< 0, (41)
which implies the constraint (9) should be satisfied for any ξi.
Lastly, the maximum expected utility of agent i is given by
E[U˜i] = γi − βi
(
1
ξx + ξ˜i
+ ξ˜−1j
)
− ci(ξ˜i). (42)
Therefore, γi given by (24) is designed to satisfy individual
rationality. Meanwhile, the expected payment is as small as
the effort cost ci(ξ˜i).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1, except for
that βi is designed to ensure that the derivative over ξi as
shown in (39) is always positive so that the selected agents
would prefer to exert maximum effort.
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